Nje FBI per Shqiperine

Nje FBI per Shqiperine

Fabian Zhilla
E Premte, 14 Gusht 2009

Koeficienti i larte i humbjeve ne radhet e policise shqiptare ne luften kunder krimit, ngre pikepyetje te rendesishme ne lidhje me te gjithe strukturen, organizimin dhe politikat e luftes kunder krimit te organizuar dhe jo vetem ne Shqiperi. Megjithe perpjekjet e shumta te forcave te rendit, krimi i organizuar serish arrin te jete i suksesshem ne neutralizimin e tyre. Pikerisht per kete, lufta kunder krimit te organizuar kerkon jo vetem nje perballje frontale, por shterim te te gjitha mjeteve dhe menyrave qe e forcojne ate. Vendi yne fatkeqesisht ofron shume mundesi oportune qe krimi i organizuar te zhvillohet, sic jane niveli i larte i korrupsionit, evazioni shqetesues fiskal (mbi 30% e veprimeve financiare kryen jashte institucioneve te autorizuara) dhe pozicioni mjaft i volitshem gjeografik. Nga ana tjeter, nje faktor tjeter po aq i rendesishem eshte edhe struktura shume e shperndare ne vend e luftes kunder krimit te organizuar apo dhe veprave penale qe lidhen direkt ose indirekt me te, si korrupsioni pasiv apo aktiv, pastrimi i parave, cilesi dokumentesh shteterore lehtesisht te manipulueshem, si dhe niveli mjaft i ulet i perditshmerise te strukturave policore ne pergjithesi, me njohurite bashkekohore per teknikat e perdorura nga krimi i organizuar sot. Per kete arsye, mbase eshte koha qe shteti shqiptar te hedh hapa konkrete, per ngritjen e FBI-s shqiptare, nje shembull qe me shume sukses po e ndjek dhe Britania e Madhe, koheve te fundit me Agjencine kunder Krimeve te Renda (SOCA). Por perpara se te shkojme ne argumentimin se pse ngritja e nje strukture te tille eshte emergjente ne Shqiperi, do te ishte me interes te shtjellonim disa detaje, te cilat nuk jane evidentuar dukshem ne analizat e fundit te ngjarjes ne Durres.

Se pari, ata qe humben jeten ne kete krim nuk ishin police te thjeshte, por nder efektivet me me eksperience ne vend. Ky perben nje shqetesim mjaft serioz, pasi tregon se prej kohesh sofistikimi i krimit ne Shqiperi po i kalon permasat e krimit ordiner dhe po konturohet ne nje krimi mjaft profesional dhe te tipit mafioz. Ne kete drejtim analiza per kete ngjarje duhet te jete thelbesore dhe jo te mjaftohet vetem ne gjetjen e autoreve, pergjegjes direkt te ketij deshtimi. Se dyti, rasti Dajti konfirmon dhe nje here se struktura dhe format e operimit te krimineleve shqiptare nuk kane pesuar ndonje ndryshim te dukshem gjate periudhes se tranzicionit, gje qe tregon se metodologjite e luftes kunder krimit te organizuar ne Shqiperi, nuk kane dhene rezultatin e duhur. Karakteristikat e pershkruara nga shume studiues serioze te krimit te organizuar ne Shqiperi, si francezi Reufer konfirmohen dhe nga tipologjia e grupit te Dritan Dajtit. Edhe ketu struktura e grupit, ndertohet ne nje njesi te vogel (zakonisht nuk e kalon nr. 5), kryesisht me nje anetaresi qe bazohet ne lidhje gjaku, jane shume inteligjent, te dhunshem dhe ambientohen shume shpejt me teknologjite e kohes. Se treti, ajo qe bie ne sy eshte gjithashtu dhe arsimimi deri diku superior, i autorit te krimit me shumicen e njesise speciale, gje qe nxjerr ne pah se kontingjenti i krimit tashme eshte shume me cilesor se me pare. Se katerti, sipas medias se fundi, numrat e telefonit qe posedonte Dritan Dajti tregojne shtrirjen dhe forcen e krimit te organizuar, i cili jo vetem qe ka lidhje me kapjen e strukturave shteterore por dhe me fushen e biznesit. Lidhja e krimit me biznesin eshte nje tjeter faktor shqetesues, pasi jo vetem qe veshtireson investigimin e krimit por kriminalizon dhe biznesin, duke deformuar keshtu zhvillimin ekonomik nga nje ekonomi e rregulluar nga forcat e tregut te lire, ne nje ekonomi te influencuar nga krimi i organizuar. Me pak fjale, krimi i organizuar ne Shqiperi eshte mjaft aktiv. Ai nuk eshte minimizuar por perkundrazi, gradualisht po shnderrohet ne forma shume me te sofistikuara, sjellje po aq te dhunshme sa me pare. Kjo situate e ben imperative ngritjen e nje agjencie speciale, e denje per t'u perballur me keto sfida te kohes.

Pra per t'iu kthyer analizes sone ne lidhje me ngritjen e nje strukture speciale, sic do te ishte nje FBI e mundshme shqiptare, rasti i Dritan Dajtit tregon se pervec ndryshimeve ligjore parciale, sic jane dhe ndermarrjet e fundit te kryeministrit ne lidhje me rishikimin e ligjit perkates per statusin e policeve te vrare ne krye te detyres, ky i fundit duhet te beje pikerisht ate qe Presidenti amerikan Rusvelt, beri ne vitin 1908. Shume faktore te Amerikes se atehershme, qe shtyne presidentin e asaj kohe per kete nisem, nuk ndryshojne me situaten aktuale ne Shqiperi. Nje shoqeri ku dhuna eshte mjaft prezent, zhvillimet e shpejta teknologjike, korrupsioni galopant ne politike dhe strukturat lokale, levizje masive demografike ne qytetet kryesore, monopolet e reja te bisnesit, ndryshimet e shpejta ideologjike, si dhe lufterat ne rajon e bejne te domosdoshme ngritjen e kesaj agjencie.

Ky institucion duhet te jete teresisht i pavarur politikisht dhe juridiksioni i tij, duhet te perfshije si sektorin shteteror dhe ate privat. Ashtu sikurse FBI kjo agjenci duhet te hetoje kryesisht krimin e organizuar, korrupsionin, terrorizmin dhe vjedhjet, mashtrimet e permasave serioze.

Ne kete njesi duhet te perfshihen shume drejtori, qe sot gjenden nen 'sqetullat' e ekzekutivit, si drejtori qe lidhen me krimin ekonomik dhe luften kunder korrupsionit. Shtrirja e 'pushtetit' te saj edhe ne luften kunder korrupsionit, eshte mjaft e rendesishme sidomos ne investigimin e atyre institucioneve qe merren sot direkt apo indirekt, me luften ndaj krimit dhe korrupsionit, si gjykatat, prokuroria, Kontrolli i Larte i Shtetit, Inspektorati i Deklarimit dhe Kontrollit te Pasurive etj.

Statusi i kesaj agjencie duhet te jete prestigjioz, si ne kuptimin financiar por dhe ne imunitetin e ofruar, kjo dhe per vete specifiken e kesaj agjencie. Rekrutimi duhet bazuar jo me ne individ me "muskuj" sic ka ndodhur rendom ne strukturat tona te antikrimit, por ne njerezit me te kualifikuar dhe te profesionalizuar ne fushat perkatese, qe lidhen me vete profilin e saj.

Kjo agjenci realizon pikerisht ato, qe sistemi yne ndaj krimit te organizuar dhe korrupsionit vuan. Nje agjenci moderne dhe mjaft e specializuar ne keto drejtime. Nje institucion me fleksibilitetin dhe shpejtesine, per t'u perballur me zhvillimet teknologjike dhe financiare te kohes, qe sherbejne ne sofistikimin e krimit. Konsolidimin ne nje strukture te vetme dhe te pavarur politikisht, te shume drejtorive te shperndara sot ne institucione te ndryshme shteterore, nen kontrollin e ekzekutivit. Kjo do te rris eficencen ne goditjen ndaj shume lidhjeve te krimit, me boten e politikes dhe bisnesit. Do te ndihmoje ne nje nderlidhje me te mire midis strukturave perkatese, brenda se njejtes agjenci, shkembim me te kontrolluar te informacionit si dhe ruajtjen dhe forcimin e tradites dhe ekspertizes ne kete drejtim, gje qe 'rrjedh' shpesh ne Policine e Shtetit me ndryshimet politike. Qeveria shqiptare duhet ta shikoje me perparesi ngritjen e kesaj agjencie, si nje mjet tashme i certifikuar ne sukseset e saj ne luften ndaj krimit te organizuar dhe korrupsionit.

The End of Rational Economics

The End of Rational Economics

http://hbr.harvardbusiness.org/2009/07/the-end-of-rational-economics/ar/1

by Dan Ariely

Your company has been operating on the premise that people—customers, employees, managers—make logical decisions. It’s time to abandon that assumption.

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In 2008, a massive earthquake reduced the financial world to rubble. Standing in the smoke and ash, Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve once hailed as “the greatest banker who ever lived,” confessed to Congress that he was “shocked” that the markets did not operate according to his lifelong expectations. He had “made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders.”

We are now paying a terrible price for our unblinking faith in the power of the invisible hand. We’re painfully blinking awake to the falsity of standard economic theory—that human beings are capable of always making rational decisions and that markets and institutions, in the aggregate, are healthily self-regulating. If assumptions about the way things are supposed to work have failed us in the hyperrational world of Wall Street, what damage have they done in other institutions and organizations that are also made up of fallible, less-than-logical people? And where do corporate managers, schooled in rational assumptions but who run messy, often unpredictable businesses, go from here?

We are finally beginning to understand that irrationality is the real invisible hand that drives human decision making. It’s been a painful lesson, but the silver lining may be that companies now see how important it is to safeguard against bad assumptions. Armed with the knowledge that human beings are motivated by cognitive biases of which they are largely unaware (a true invisible hand if there ever was one), businesses can start to better defend against foolishness and waste.

The emerging field of behavioral economics offers a radically different view of how people and organizations operate. In this article I will examine a small set of long-held business assumptions through a behavioral economics lens. In doing so I hope to show not only that companies can do a better job of making their products and services more effective, their customers happier, and their employees more productive but that they can also avoid catastrophic mistakes.

Behavioral Economics 101

Drawing on aspects of both psychology and economics, the operating assumption of behavioral economics is that cognitive biases often prevent people from making rational decisions, despite their best efforts. (If humans were comic book characters, we’d be more closely related to Homer Simpson than to Superman.) Behavioral economics eschews the broad tenets of standard economics, long taught as guiding principles in business schools, and examines the real decisions people make—how much to spend on a cup of coffee, whether or not to save for retirement, deciding whether to cheat and by how much, whether to make healthy choices in diet or sex, and so on. For example, in one study where people were offered a choice of a fancy Lindt truffle for 15 cents and a Hershey’s kiss for a penny, a large majority (73%) chose the truffle. But when we offered the same chocolates for one penny less each—the truffle for 14 cents and the kiss for nothing—only 31% of participants selected it. The word “free,” we discovered, is an immensely strong lure, one that can even turn us away from a better deal and toward the “free” one.

For the past few decades, behavioral economics has been largely considered a fringe discipline—a somewhat estranged little cousin of standard economics. Though practitioners of traditional economics reluctantly admitted that people may behave irrationally from time to time, they have tended to stick to their theoretical guns. They have argued that experiments conducted by behavioral economists and psychologists, albeit interesting, do not undercut rational models because they are carried out under controlled conditions and without the most important regulator of rational behavior: the large, competitive environment of the market. Then, in October 2008, Greenspan made his confession. Belief in the ultimate rationality of humans, organizations, and markets crumbled, and the attendant dangers to business and public policy were fully exposed.

Unlike the FDA, for example, which forces medical practitioners and pharmaceutical companies to test their assumptions before sending treatments into the marketplace, no entity requires business (and also the public sector) to get at the truth of things. Accordingly, it’s up to firms to begin investigating basic beliefs about customers, employees, operations, and policies. When organizations acknowledge and anticipate irrational behavior, they can learn to offset it and avoid damaging results. Let’s take a closer look at a few examples.

The Dark Side of Teamwork

A few years ago, my colleagues and I found that most individuals, operating on their own and given the opportunity, will cheat—but just a little bit, all the while indulging in rationalization that allows them to live with themselves. (See “How Honest People Cheat,” HBR, February 2008.) We also found that the simple act of asking people to think of their ethical foundations—say, the Ten Commandments—or their own moral code before they had the opportunity to cheat eliminated the dishonesty.

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How Honest People Cheat

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How Honest People Cheat

http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/cs/2008/01/how_honest_people_cheat.html

8:21 AM Tuesday January 29, 2008
by Dan Ariely

Tags:Ethics

There are two basic conceptions of cheating. One holds that people are fundamentally dishonest and look actively for opportunities to cheat. A person walks by, say, a gas

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station,considers how much money is in the till, who might be around to stop the theft, and what punishment awaits him if caught (including potential time off for good behavior). On the basis of a cost-benefit calculation, the would-be thief decides whether to rob the place. The second notion is that people are basically honest. They are not out there scoping for chances to cheat, but circumstances tempt them. They "borrow" a pen from a conference, take an extra splash of soda from the soft drink dispenser, exaggerate the value of a television on a property loss statement, or falsely report a meal with Aunt Nava as a business expense (well, she did ask how work was going). How prevalent is this kind of dishonesty, and what drives it?

My fellow researchers and I tempted a few thousand "honest" people to cheat in a set of scientifically controlled experiments at Harvard Business School, MIT, Princeton, UCLA, and Yale. Participants were paid about 50 cents for each correct response to a set of 20 simple math problems that they had five minutes to complete. In control groups, the answer sheets were graded--on average, the participants correctly answered four problems. But in experimental groups, answer sheets were blindly shredded so that respondents knew that it was impossible for us to tell whether they had answered the questions correctly. In effect, participants could simply lie and receive more money than they had legitimately earned. On average, they claimed to have correctly solved two problems more than they knew they had (six rather than four). That is, given the chance, the majority of people cheated by about 50%. Viewed from a different angle, however, they lied about only two of the 16 problems they did not solve--12.5% of their cheating opportunity.

The results grew more interesting when we tried to understand the circumstances that influence the degree to which people cheat. First, we found that the risk of being caught did not change the level of dishonesty. For example, allowing participants to avoid revealing any sign of possible mischief (for example, by having complete anonymity in how much payment they took) did not affect the average level of cheating among them. Second, we found that getting people to contemplate their own standards of honesty (by recalling the Ten Commandments or signing an honor code) eliminated cheating completely. Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, we found that if payment was given in poker chips, which were exchanged for cash a few seconds later, the average level of cheating more than doubled.

These results point to a few interesting aspects of human nature. One is that most of us, when tempted, are willing to be a little dishonest, regardless of the risks. Another is that even when we have no chance of getting caught, we still don't become wild liars--our conscience imposes some limits. Finally, it's clear that we have an incredible ability to rationalize our dishonesty and that justifying it becomes substantially easier when cheating is one step removed from cash. Nonmonetary exchanges allow people greater psychological latitude to cheat--leading to crimes that go well beyond pilfered pens to backdated stock options, falsified financial reports, and crony deals. Such latitude is the force behind the Enrons of the world.

Dan Ariely is the Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Behavioral Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge and a visiting professor at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. He is the author of Predictably Irrational (HarperCollins, 2008).